


To Generate or Not? Safety-Driven Unlearned Diffusion Models Are Still Easy to Generate Unsafe Images ... For Now

Yimeng Zhang^{1,2,*}, Jinghan Jia^{1,*}, Xin Chen², Aochuan Chen¹, Yihua Zhang¹, Jiancheng Liu¹, Ding Ke², Sijia Liu¹

¹Michigan State University

²Applied ML, Intel



Paper

Code

Benchmark

➤ Motivation

❖ For diffusion models (DMs), safety-driven unlearning methods [1-3] face doubts about their effectiveness.

❖ To assess the trustworthiness of these models, a ‘discrete’ adversarial text prompt attack, **UnlearnDiffAtk**, is proposed.

➤ Key Insights

❖ As shown in *Figure 1. (a) – (c)* and *Figure 2.*, our proposed adversarial prompt attack (UnlearnDiffAtk) utilize **DMs' classification abilities** [4] to generate attacks based on single target image **without needing auxiliary models**. → Faster and less memory usage.

❖ As shown in *Figure 3.*, the choice of target image x_{tgt} is flexible and it can be a randomly-chosen internet image, relevant to the concept targeted for erasure.

❖ The optimized adversarial prompts consist of **5 discrete text tokens** as shown in *Figure 1. (d)*.




Figure 1. Comparison of attack methodologies on DMs and UnlearnDiffAtk Demonstrations.

➤ Adversary against Unlearned DMs:

UnlearnDiffAtk




Figure 2. Pipeline of our proposed adversarial prompt learning method, UnlearnDiffAtk, for unlearned diffusion model (DM) evaluations.

$$\text{minimize}_{c'} \mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta^*}(\mathbf{x}_{tgt,t} | c')\|_2^2] \quad (1)$$

❖ Analyses

$$\text{Diffusion Classifier [4]: } p_{\theta}(c_i | \mathbf{x}) \propto \frac{\exp\{-\mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_t | c_i)\|_2^2]\}}{\sum_j \exp\{-\mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_t | c_j)\|_2^2]\}} \quad (2)$$

How to create an adversarial prompt?

$$\text{maximize}_{c'} p_{\theta^*}(c' | \mathbf{x}_{tgt})$$

Remove absolute magnitudes in *Equation (2)*:

$$\frac{1}{\sum_j \exp\{\mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_t | c_i)\|_2^2] - \mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_t | c_j)\|_2^2]\}} \text{minimize}_{c'} \sum_j \exp\{\mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta^*}(\mathbf{x}_{tgt,t} | c')\|_2^2] - \mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta^*}(\mathbf{x}_{tgt,t} | c_j)\|_2^2]\} \quad (3)$$

Utilizing Jensen’s inequality for convex functions, the individual objective function (for a specific j) in *Equation (3)* is upper bounded by:

$$\frac{1}{2} \exp\{2\mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta^*}(\mathbf{x}_{tgt,t} | c')\|_2^2]\} + \frac{1}{2} \exp\{-2\mathbb{E}_{t, \epsilon} [\|\epsilon - \epsilon_{\theta^*}(\mathbf{x}_{tgt,t} | c_j)\|_2^2]\}$$

independent of attack variable c'

Finally, exclude the terms that are unrelated to c' and we can get *Equation (1)*.

➤ Experiment Setups

Unlearning for DMs:

- ❖ ESD (erased stable diffusion)
- ❖ FMN (Forget-Me-Not)
- ❖ AC (ablating concepts)
- ❖ UCE (unified concept editing)
- ❖ SLD (safe latent diffusion)

Attack Baseline: P4D [5]

Figure 3. Image generation of unlearned DM (obtained using ESD) against our proposed adversarial prompt attack using Internet-sourced target images x_{tgt} .





Figure 4. Generated images using ESD under different attacks for concept unlearning.

Figure 5. Generated images using ESD under different attacks for object unlearning.

➤ Performance and Visualizations

Table 1. Performance of various attack methods against unlearned DMs in NSWF concept unlearning, measured by attack success rate (ASR) and computation time in minutes (mins).

I2P:		Nudity			Violence			Illegal Activity			Atk. Time per Prompt (mins)
Total Prompts #:		142			756			727			-
Unlearned DMs:		ESD	FMN	SLD	ESD	FMN	SLD	ESD	FMN	SLD	-
Attacks:	No Attack	20.42%	88.03%	33.10%	27.12%	43.39%	22.93%	30.99%	32.83%	27.78%	-
(ASR %)	P4D	69.71%	97.89%	77.46%	80.56%	85.85%	62.43%	85.83%	88.03%	81.98%	34.70
	UnlearnDiffAtk	76.05%	97.89%	82.39%	80.82%	84.13%	62.57%	85.01%	86.66%	82.81%	26.29

Table 2. Attack performance against style unlearning

Artistic Style:		Van Gogh						Atk. Time per Prompt (mins)		
Unlearned DMs:		ESD		FMN		AC		UCE		-
		Top-1	Top-3	Top-1	Top-3	Top-1	Top-3	Top-1	Top-3	-
Attacks:	No Attack	2.00%	16.00%	10.00%	32.00%	12.00%	52.00%	62.00%	78.00%	-
(ASR %)	P4D	30.00%	78.00%	54.00%	90.00%	68.00%	94.00%	98.00%	100.00%	50.79
	UnlearnDiffAtk	32.00%	76.00%	56.00%	90.00%	77.00%	92.00%	94.00%	100.00%	38.87

Table 3. Attack performance against object unlearning

Object Classes:		Church	Parachute	Tench	Garbage Truck	Atk. Time per Prompt (mins)		
Unlearned DMs:		ESD	FMN	ESD	FMN	ESD	FMN	-
Attacks:	No Attack	14%	52%	4%	46%	2%	42%	-
(ASR %)	P4D	56%	98%	48%	100%	28%	96%	43.65
	UnlearnDiffAtk	60%	96%	54%	100%	36%	100%	31.32

[1] Zhang Y, Chen X, Jia J, et al. Defensive Unlearning with Adversarial Training for Robust Concept Erasure in Diffusion Models, Arxiv 2024.

[2] Zhang Y, Zhang Y, Yao Y, et al. UnlearnCanvas: A stylized image dataset to benchmark machine unlearning for diffusion models, Arxiv 2024.

[3] Fan C, Liu J, Zhang Y, et al. Salun: Empowering machine unlearning via gradient-based weight saliency in both image classification and generation, ICLR 2024.

[4] Li AC, Prabhudesai M, Duggal S, et al. Your diffusion model is secretly a zero-shot classifier, ICCV 2023.

[5] Chin Z Y, Jiang C M, Huang C C, et al. Prompting4debugging: Red-teaming text-to-image diffusion models by finding problematic prompts, ICML 2024.